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Petitioner Prosper Team, Inc. respectfully submits its brief on appeal.

STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Vhe Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a)(West 2009)(the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over "final
orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies");
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-403(4)(d), -403(4)(g) & -403(4)(h)(iv) (West 2009)(uthe
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings" when the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law, the action is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record, or the agency action is otherwise arbitrary or capricious);
and Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-508(8)(a)(West 2009)("any aggrieved party may secure
judicial review by commencing an action in the court of appeals against the Workforce
Appeals Board").

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue requiring review is whether the Board erred in holding that Prosper
Team, Inc. failed to establish the elements of culpability, knowledge and control for a
just cause discharge. The standard of review is whether the Board's decision is
supported by substantial evidence, when viewed in light of the whole record, Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g), whether the Board misapplied the law, Utah Code Ann.
§63G-4-403(4)(d), or whether the decision is otherwise arbitrary or capricious Utah
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Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iv). Because application of the Employment Security
Act and "requires little highly specialized or technical knowledge that would be
uniquely within the [Board's] expertise"..., this Court should review the agency's
decision "with only moderate deference" Autoliv ASP v. Department of Workforce
Services, 29 P.3d 7 (Utah App. 2001), and only uphold the Board if the decision falls
within the limits of reasonableness and rationality and is supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record. Drake v. Industrial Comm'n., 939
P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). '"Substantial evidence' is that quantum and quality of
relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a
conclusion." WWCHolding Co, v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 2002 UT 23, | 8, 44 P.3d
714; Ellsworth v. Department of Workforce Serv., 2010 UT App 87.
STATEMENT OF PRESERVATION OF ISSUES
Prosper Team, Inc., preserved the issues presented to this Court by submitting
to the Workforce Appeals Board the issues of culpability (R. at 084), knowledge, (R.
at 082), and control, (R. at 086), and whether it was reasonable and rational to affirm
the Administrative Law Judge's award of unemployment benefits.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES
The statutes and administrative rules are determinative in this matter are set forth in
Appendix A, which include the following:
Utah Administrative Rules, R994-405-202(l), (2) & (3)(2010)
Utah Administrative Rules, R994-405-208(l), (2) & (4)(2010)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the award of unemployment benefits by the Utah
Department of Workforce Services.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The statement of facts is based upon the transcripts of the unemployment
hearing, the record, and the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") and
Workforce Appeals Board ("Board").
1.

Petitioner Prosper Team, Inc., ("Prosper"), is a Utah Corporation. Respondents

are the Utah Workforce Appeals Board and Matt Davis a former employee of Prosper.
(Record at 036, lines 1-3, 36-37)(hereinafter "R. at _:_").
2.

Davis was a sales representative employed by Prosper selling products and

services over the telephone. (R. at 042:23-25). Davis knew what it took to be
successful and had been successful during his brief employment at Prosper. (R. at
055:3-5). Davis was discharged on May 14, 2010, for attendance violations in failing
to adhere to his assigned work schedule. (R. at 043:12-14; 046:14-21).
3.

Davis worked at Prosper from March 1, 2010, to May 14, 2010. (R. at

006-.Exhibit 6). The Board in its decision stated that Davis did not need to adhere to
Prosper's work schedule because Davis was a "seasoned sales representative" and thus
"entitled to a little latitude" in his work schedule. (R. at 091). As Davis worked at
Prosper for only 10 weeks, Davis was not a seasoned sales representative. Even if
Davis was a seasoned employee, there is no evidence to find that Prosper allowed its
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seasoned employees any greater latitude in their work schedules. During his last week
of employment Davis either did not report to work, arrived late, or left early every day
of the week. (R. at 008:Exhibit 8; 010:Exhibit 10; 043-044:23-44, 1-27).
Characterizing such flagrant disregard of Prosper's attendance policy as a "little
latitude" mischaracterizes Davis1 non-conforming behavior.
4.

Davis worked approximately 46 hours a week. (R. at 042:35-41). The ALJ and

Board suggest that Davis' failure to adhere to companyfs attendance rules was not
injurious because Davis averaged more than 40 hours a week. (R. at 080; 091). The
fact Davis averaged more than 40 hours a week is not dispositive of the issue of
culpability in this case. Davis was terminated for failing to adhere to his assigned
schedule and not for the lack of hours worked. Reciting how many hours Davis
worked does not address Prosper's injury. The finding that Davis "went to work and
left when he saw fit" affirms that Davis did not adhere to his assigned schedule. (R. at
089).
5.

Davis was paid commissions on the sales he made. (R. at 043:3-6). If Davis'

sales were low, Davis was eligible to receive minimum wage/overtime pay. In finding
that the element of culpability had not been satisfied, the ALJ reasoned that Davis'
conduct was not culpable because Davis was paid on commission. (R. at 080).
Whether Davis was paid commissions or not does not resolve the issue of culpability
or a just cause discharge. Being paid commissions does not entitle an employee to set
his or her own schedule. Such a conclusion is neither supported by the law nor the
facts. An employer has the prerogative to set reasonable attendance requirements
4

regardless of the manner of compensation. Employers still need to have the doors
opened in the morning and have staff available at the end of the day. An employer is
entitled to set work schedules to meet its legitimate needs. The finding that Davis
worked on commissions does not address Prospers injury caused by Davis' refusal to
adhere to his schedule.
6.

Prosper's provided Davis with a copy of it attendance policy during new

employee orientation. (R. at 044:34-43; 072:9). Davis testified he could not recall the
specifics about the policy. (R. at 078). On April 14, 2010 Just one month after being
hired, Davis was issued a written warning instructing him to work his assigned
schedule. (R. at 009:Exhibit 9).
7.

When Davis was not at work during his assigned shift, Prosper lost revenue.

(048:10-15). The ALJ stated that though Prosper "may have thought the stated
schedule would lead to more contacts with clients and more revenue", Prosper didn't
show it was harmed by Davis' "occasional adjustments" to his work hours. (R. at
080)(emphasis added). The ALJ does not cited to any evidence that
Prosper did not lose revenue when Davis did not work his schedule. It was arbitrary
and capricious for the ALJ to ignore Prosper's uncontradicted testimony on this issue.
It was also arbitrary and capricious to characterize Davis' conduct as "occasional
adjustments", (R. at 080), when Davis regularly did not adhere to his schedule. (R. at
49:20-27).
8.

The Board also found Davis' non-adherence to Prosper's attendance policy was

justified because he did it "to benefit clients and maximize his personal income." (R. at
5

091). It is inconsistent with the Department's Rules for the Board to find an
employee's refusal to adhere to an attendance policy acceptable on the grounds that the
employee was maximizing his personal income. An employee should not be rewarded
for ignoring an employer's attendance policy to advance his own interests.
9.

By not working his assigned shift, Davis was insubordinate, created distrust,

and missed appointments. (R. at 048:10-19). His actions which reflected poorly on
Prosper and its partners. (R. at 047:38-42). Prosper had the prerogative to establish
reasonable work rules. The record establishes that consistent with its rules, Prosper
trained, encouraged, warned and then terminated Davis. Neither the ALJ nor Board
cited to any evidence that Davis' actions were not injurious to Prosper.
10.

Prosper did allow its sales personnel, including Davis, some flexibility in their

schedules to accommodate personal needs and customer schedules. This flexibility
was conditioned on obtaining supervisor approval before altering their schedules. (R.
at 044:14-17). Davis knew of this requirement but "most frequently" did not keep in
contact with his supervisor. (R. at 050:30-34).
11.

Davis received several verbal warnings (R. at 048:25-36). Davis was issued a

written warning. (R. at 090:Exhibit 9). Davis was written up for failing to adhere to
his schedule, for not calling his supervisor when he altered his schedule, and for
missing an appointment. (R. at 009:Exhibit 9).
12.

Prosper issued Davis the written warning on April 14, 2010, just five weeks

after Davis was hired. The written warning included a Section titled "Expected
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Performance Improvements" which stated "Work your scheduled shift of M 8 AM5PM, T-TH 12AM-8PM, F 8AM-4PM and S 8:30 AM-1PM." (R. at 009:Exhibit 9).
Davis signed the written warning and testified "Yeah. Yeah, we did-we talked about
the schedule, definitely."(R. at 059:9-17).
13.

Davis either did not show up for work, arrived late, or left early on May 7, May

10, May 11, May 12, May 13 and May 14. (008:Exhibit 8; 010:Exhibit 10; 043044:23-44, 1-27). Davis was terminated on May 14, 2010, for attendance violations
and failing to adhere to his assigned shift.
Additional Marshaled Facts
14.

Davis claimed that he did not think that his poor attendance was putting his job

in jeopardy. (R. at 064:38-43). The written warning issued on April 14,2010, stated in
the middle of the document that "Failure to correct the above actions immediately may
result in future disciplinary action up to and including termination." (R. at 009:Exhibit
9). Davis also testified that he was surprised that he wasn't terminated on Monday
May 10th when he was a no-call no-show. (R. at 054:29-44; 059:24-31). This
testimony confirms that Davis knew or should have known that failing to adhere to his
assigned schedule could lead to termination. It was inconsistent for Davis to testify
that he was surprised to be let go on Friday May 14th, when he testified that he didn't
understand why he wasn't let go on Monday May 10th. A finding that Davis didn't
know his poor attendance might lead to separation is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record.
7

15.

Davis alleges that he didn't adhere to the stated schedule because he thought his

schedule was merely a suggestion or recommendation. (R. at 053-54:42-44, 1-2;
058:21-24; 068:39-44; 069:17-23). This finding is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record. Other than Davis' own selfserving testimony, Davis presented no evidence to support his claim that his schedule
was only a suggestion. Prosper explained its attendance policy to Davis during
orientation, (R. at 044:40-42). If Davis did not understand his obligations at that time,
Davis was specifically instructed in the written warning to "Work your scheduled shift
of M 8AM-5PM, T-TH 12AM-8PM, F 8AM-4PM and S 8:30 AM-1PM". (R. at
009:Exhibit 9). Davis signed the written warning (R. at 009:Exhibit 9) and testified
that he and his supervisor "definitely,f talked about his schedule. (R. at 059:9-17).
The written warning was credible, competent, tangible evidence that directly
contradicted Davis' uncorroborated testimony. It was arbitrary and capricious for the
ALJ and Board to conclude that Davis' unsubstantiated testimony was more credible
than the written warning. There is not substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record that Prosper only suggested or recommended that Davis work the
assigned schedule.
16.

Davis claims that his assigned schedule was similar to the schedule another

group of employees had been trying, and it was "suggested" that he should do the
same. (R. at 063:3-7). Davis presented no evidence that another team had been
"trying" the schedule, nor that the schedule was only a "suggestion". Prosper's
testified that Davis had been assigned a specific schedule, and "One hundred percent
8

disagree[d]" that there wasn't an assigned schedule. (R. at 050-51:42-44, 1). It is
illogical for Prosper to issue Davis a written warning instructing him to work his
assigned shift, if his shift was only a "suggestion". It is also illogical for Davis to sign
a written warning for failing to adhere to his shift, if his shift was only a suggestion.
There is not substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record to support
the finding that the schedule was only a "suggestion".
L7,

Davis claimed that because he worked on commissions he was allowed to set

his own schedule to accommodate potential customer's needs. (R. at 063:3-7; 069:1723). In context this statement is true. Prosper did grant its sales employees some
latitude to change their schedules to accommodate customer needs. However, Prosper
also required its employees to obtain supervisor approval prior to doing so. (R. at
044:16-17). If Davis wanted to alter his schedule to accommodate a customer's
schedule he needed to obtain his supervisor's approval. (R. at 044:16-17). This was
reinforced in the written warning which said "Call me if you are going to be late or
something comes up". (R. at 009:Exhibit 9).
Davis also testified:
Anderson:

Well is it your testimony that you could effectively schedule - set
your own schedule?

Claimant:

We were required to schedule our own appointments, yes.

Anderson:

I didn't ask about appointments. I asked if you were able to set
your own schedule?

Claimant:

To some degree we were. (R. at 068:27-33).

9

Davis' response is insightful. Davis' testimony shows that he understood that he could
only modify his schedule "to some degree". This testimony acknowledges that there
was a set schedule and that Davis only had limited ability to change it. It is more
consistent when viewed in light of the whole record that Davis was assigned a specific
schedule and that he needed supervisor approval to modify it. There is not substantial
evidence in light of the whole record that Davis was allowed to set his own schedule.
18.

Davis claimed that so long as he was putting in the hours he could come in late

or leave early. (R. at 068:19-25). This finding is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record. Davis was assigned to work "M 8 AM-5PM,
T-TH 12AM-8PM, F 8AM-4PM and S 8:30 AM-1PM", (R. at 009:Exhibit 9). This
schedule calculates to be 45.5 hours per week. Davis averaged 46.36 hours per week.
(R. at 006:Exhbit 6, R. at 042:35-41). Based on the average number of hours worked,
Davis was "putting in the time". However, within five weeks of being hired, Davis
was written up for failing to adhere to his schedule. (R. at 009:Exhibit 9). Such an
action is inconsistent with the notion that Davis could come and go as he pleased so
long as he was putting in his time. Putting in the time wasn't the problem, it was
Davis' failure to work his assigned shift. There is not substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record that Davis could come in late and leave early so
long as he was putting in the time.
19.

Davis alleged that others, including his supervisor, did not appear to adhere to

the same work schedule and came and when as they pleased. (R. at 058:29-31). Davis
provided no witnesses that corroborated his testimony. When challenged on his
10

perception that others and went as they pleased, Davis admitted that he did not know
whether others even worked the same schedule. (R. at 058:21-24). Davis' supervisor
specifically testified that he (the supervisor) in fact worked a different schedule. (R. at
54:8-12). The Board was arbitrary and capricious in finding that Davis' actions were
justified because he "felt he was entitled to do the same". (R. at 091). Davis' feelings
of entitlement do not refute competent credible evidence that Davis was assigned to
work a particular schedule. Even if others had greater latitude in their schedules,
which Prosper disputes, Prosper had the prerogative to require Davis to adhere to a
specific schedule. There is not substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record to support the finding that Davis was "entitled" to come and go as he pleased.
20.

Davis claimed that some of his late arrivals or early departures could have been

because he forgot to use the time clock. (R. at 060:1-2; 067:35-40). Davis provided no
corroborating testimony or evidence that he ever forgot to use the time clock. Davis
schedule required him to work 45.5 hours per week. (R. at 009:Exhibit 9). On average
Davis worked 46.36 hours per week. (R. at 006:Exhbit 6, R. at 042:35-41). The
correlation between his hours worked and his assigned schedule suggests that Davis
regularly used the time clock. Since Prosper was obligated to pay minimum wage and
overtime to Davis when his sales were down, Davis was highly motivated to ensure his
hours were properly reported. There was no evidence other than Davis' own
speculation that he may have forgot to use the time clock. In fact, Davis testified "I
probably clocked out and failed to clock back in. I don't know for sure." (R. at 067:3738). Such speculative testimony cannot be viewed as credible evidence that Davis
11

failed to clock in or out. There is not substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record to support the finding that Davis' failure to adhere to his schedule was in
fact a failure to clock in and out.
21.

The ALJ and Board state that Davis' conduct was not so serious as to jeopardize

Prospers interests requiring immediate discharge. (R. at 080; 091). Such a finding
ignores Prosper's measured and methodical approach to work with Davis to modify his
behavior. Prosper informed Davis of its attendance requirements during orientation.
(R. at 044:40-42). Prosper issuing verbal warnings instructing Davis to adhere to his
schedule. (R. at 048:28-32). Prosper then issued Davis a written warning. (R. at
009:Exhibit 9). Prosper allowed time for Davis to correct his behavior, (R. at 073:2025), and when his behavior did not improve, (R. at 046:18-23), Prosper justifiably
terminated Davis based on his unwillingness to modify his behavior. (R. at 049:6-8).
Prosper testified that it iost money when Davis failed to adhere to his schedule. (R. at
048:3-11). Prosper testified it lost trust in Davis for his insubordinate behavior. (R. at
048:17-19). When an employer methodically addresses an ongoing behavioral
problem with no improvement, (R. at 049:6-9), an employer is not obligated to tolerate
non-conforming behavior indefinitely. Prosper's legitimate business interests were
being impacted by Davis' conduct. There is not substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record to support the finding that Davis' conduct was insufficiently
serious for termination.
1

The ALJ finding that the time clock "may have been out of order, which was not
unusual" (R. at 078) is neither stated in the record nor did Davis ever claim the time
clock was out of order.
12

22.

The ALJ and Board found that because Davis did not have a clear

understanding of Prosper's attendance requirements, Davis could not conform his
actions to meet Prosper's expectations. (R. at 080; 091-092). Such a finding ignores
the written warning that outlined Prosper's expectations. (R. at 009:Exhibit 9). If
Davis did not have a clear understand of what Prosper expected of him, it is because
he chose not to understand. Also, Davis had the ability to conform his actions to meet
Prosper's expectations by keeping in touch with his supervisor if circumstances
dictated a change to his schedule.

Prosper testified that "most frequently" Davis did

not communicate with his supervisor. (R. at 050:30-34). Davis may have preserved
his job had he kept in touch with his supervisor. (R. at 049:20-23). There is not
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record to support the finding
that Davis could not conform his actions to meet Prosper's expectations.
22.

The Board found that Davis provided "credible testimony that he simply did not

understand the assigned schedule was anything other than a recommendation." (R. at
091). Such a finding is arbitrary and capricious. On April 14, 2010, Davis was issued
a written warning outlining his schedule. (R. at 009:Exhibit 9). The written warning
stated that failure to show improvement may result in further discipline, including
termination. (R. at 009:Exhibit 9). The record shows that Davis received various
verbal and written warnings. (R. at 009:Exhibit 9; 048:25-36; 073:22-25). Davis
testified that he and his supervisor "definitely" talked about his work schedule. (R. at
059:13-17). If Davis "simply did not understand" it is because he chose to not
understand. A reasonable person in similar circumstances would have understood that
13

the written warning to "work your assigned shift" was sufficiently clear. Other than
Davis' self-serving statements that he thought his shift was a "suggestion", there is no
testimony or other competent evidence to contradict Prosper credible written warning.
Furthermore, Davis lacked credibly to testify about the separation. When asked
on his application for unemployment whether he had been told to change or improve
his job performance, Davis answered "no". (R. at 012:Exhibit 12; 071:3-14).
Similarly, when asked whether he had received any warnings before being discharged,
Davis once again responded "no". (R. at 012:Exhibit 12; 071:20-27). When asked if
he was discharged for violating a company policy he answered "no", and when asked
if he was "fired or discharged for attendance problems" he responded "no". (R. at
012:Exhibit 12). There is not substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record that Davis could "credibly testify" or that "he simply did not understand."
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The facts of this case are not complicated. Prosper terminated Davis for failure to
adhere to his assigned schedule. Davis regularly arrived at work late or left early.
Such conduct was contrary to his job requirements. Prosper did not condone such
behavior and gave Davis verbal and written warnings. Davis continued to not adhere
to his assigned schedule. The question in this case is whether Prosper's specific
written warning to adhere to a stated schedule is sufficient to overcome Davis'
uncorroborated testimony that he thought his assigned schedule was only a
"suggestion". Prosper asserts that Board's decision is not supported by substantial
14

evidence when viewed in light of the whole record, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4403(4)(g), and it was arbitrary or capricious for the Board to award benefits. Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iv).
ARGUMENT
I. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
ELEMENT OF "CULPABILITY" WAS NOT ESTABLISHED.
In order to establish a "just cause11 discharge, an employer is required to
establish the elements of knowledge, control and culpability. Nelson v. Department of
Employment Sec., 801 P.2d 158 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The element of "culpability"
requires a showing that the conduct causing the discharge was sufficiently serious as to
jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. See Utah Admin. Code R994-405202(1)(2010). In this case, Davis' repeated refusal to adhere to his shift, and/or his
refusal to keep his supervisor informed of deviations to his shift, jeopardized Prosper's
legitimate business interest.
In finding that Prosper had not satisfied the element of culpability, the ALJ and
Board articulated a number of reasons. Breaking down each reason, it is evident that
the lack of "culpability" is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in the
light of the whole record. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g).
1.

The first reason provided by the ALJ that culpability had not been

established was "Although the Claimant did not consistently adhere to the schedule
supplied by his team leader, he nevertheless worked an average of 46.36 hours per
week." (R. at 080). As stated above, reciting the number of hours Davis worked does
15

not address the issue of whether Prosper was injured by Davis' refusal to work his
assigned shift. Davis was terminated for failing to report to work on time or not
remaining at work throughout his shift. (R. at 049:27). Davis was not terminated for
the lack of hours worked. Stating that the average number of hours worked was 46.36
does not resolve the issue of culpability.
The Department's Rules provide that culpability may be established if it is
established that an employee violates company rules. R994-405-208(l)(d) states:
(1) Violation of Company Rules.
(d) Culpability may be established if the violation of the rule did not, in and of
itself, cause harm to the employer, but the lack of compliance diminished the
employer's ability to maintain necessary discipline. Utah Admin. Code R994405-208(l)(2010).
Davis' unwillingness to adhere to his assigned schedule diminished Prosper's ability to
maintain discipline over him. Because he came and went as he pleased his supervisor
didn't know whether appointments were being missed or not. The conduct resulted in
a loss of revenue, created distrust with Prosper, and reflected poorly on Prosper and its
partners. (R. at 047:38-43; 048:3-19). Implying that Davis' behavior was not injurious
simply because Davis still working 40 hours a week ignores Prosper's right to establish
reasonable attendance requirements. The Department's own rules acknowledge that a
finding of culpability is appropriate when the employee's lack of compliance
diminished the employer's ability to maintain necessary discipline. In this case,
Prosper's ability to maintain discipline was undermined by Davis' repeated refusal to
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adhere to his specifically assigned schedule. Utah Admin. Code R994-405208(4)(2010), provides in part:
An employer generally has the right to expect lines of authority will be
followed; reasonable instructions, given in a civil manner, will be obeyed;
supervisors will be respected and their authority will not be undermined. In
determining when insubordination becomes disqualifying conduct, a disregard
of the employer's rightful and legitimate interests is of major importance.
Prosper had a right to expect its instructions regarding shift adherence would be
followed. Davis' conduct showed a complete disregard of Prosper's rightful and
legitimate interests regarding working an assigned shift. The Department's Rule finds
this disregard is "of major importance" in determining whether the conduct was
disqualifying. Prosper was injured because of Davis' indifferent and insubordinate
behavior towards Prosper's attendance policy.
2.

The ALJ next reasoned that the element of culpability had not been

established because "Further, the Claimant worked on a straight commission basis."
(R. at 080). The method of compensation is not dispositive of the issue of Prosper's
injury or culpability. It is untenable to conclude that simply because an employee is
paid on commissions that he or she is somehow entitled to choose when to work.
Davis was not an independent contractor. Prosper has a vested interest in having
Davis worked his assigned schedule. (R. at 048:3-19; 047:38-42). Whether Prosper
paid Davis on commissions is not the issue.
Utah Admin. Code R994-405-208(l)(a)(2010) states that an employer's rightful
interests are injured when an employee doesn't follow reasonably established rules:
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(1) Violation of Company Rules.
(a) An employer has the prerogative to establish and enforce work rules that
further legitimate business interests. ... If a claimant believes a rule is
unreasonable, the claimant generally has the responsibility to discuss these
concerns with the employer before engaging in conduct contrary to the rule,
thereby giving the employer an opportunity to address those concerns.
Davis never challenged the reasonableness of Prospers attendance requirements.
Davis presented no evidence that he had any discussions with Prosper that he thought
the attendance policy wasn't reasonable. Davis testified he thought the schedule was a
suggestion, (R. at 069:17-23) or that he was entitled to come and go as he pleased, (R.
at 058:3-7), but the record is clear that Davis had an assigned schedule. (R. at
009:Exhibit 9). Davis was specifically warned to "Work your scheduled shift". (R. at
009:Exhibit 9). The Board was arbitrary and capricious in finding that the element of
culpability had not been satisfied merely because Davis was paid commissions.2
3.

Continuing with the ALJ's analysis on culpability, the ALJ next states

that culpability was not established because "The Claimant's failure to stick to the
schedule set forth by the Employer may have caused some concern for his team
leader, but this situation was not so serious that the Claimant needed to be
discharged immediately" (R. at 080.). This conclusion creates two issues. First, it
2

Even if Davis was paid only commissions, an employer still has the prerogative to
require its employees to adhere to a schedule. Car lots, brokerage firms and other kinds
of employers with commissioned employees that pay their employees commissions
have the right to require someone be available when the first customer arrives or to
work the late shift. The implication that because an employee is paid commission he
or she is can come and go as they please is neither supported by the record nor societal
interests. It is a universal standard that an employer has the right to establish
reasonable attendance policies and require its employees to adhere to such policies.
SeeR994-405-208(2)(2010).
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diminishes Prospers legitimate interests to only a possibility by using the word
"may", and second it finds that Prosper's circumstances were not sufficiently serious
so as to require action.
Davis was issued a written warning one month after beginning work at Prosper.
(R. at 009:Exhibit 9). Davis continued to not adhere to his assigned schedule. By its
decision, the ALJ and Board conclude that arriving late and leaving early are behaviors
that employers should tolerate. Somehow, an employer that trains, encourages, warns,
and then enforces "may" have some concern, but such concerns should not actually
enforce its policies.
Under the heading entitled "Examples of Reasons for Discharge", Utah Admin.
Code R994-405-208(2)(a)(2010), also provides:
(2) Attendance Violations.
(a) Attendance standards are usually necessary to maintain order, control, and
productivity. It is the responsibility of a claimant to be punctual and remain at
work within the reasonable requirements of the employer. A discharge for
unjustified absence or tardiness is disqualifying if the claimant knew enforced
attendance rules were being violated. A discharge for an attendance violation
beyond the claimant's control is generally not disqualifying unless the claimant
could reasonably have given notice or obtained permission consistent with the
employer's rules, but failed to do so.
Application of the Department's own Rule to the facts establishes that Prosper was
justified in terminating Davis. The Department's Rule affirms the universal standard
that it is an employee's responsibility be punctual and remain at work. The ALJ and
Board found that Davis did not do so. (R. at 080; 091). The Rule also provides that a
discharge for absences or tardiness is disqualifying if the employee knew attendance
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rules were being violated. The written warning issued on April 14, 2010, told Davis
that he was violating an enforced rule. The written warning specifically outlined
Davis' assigned schedule. Davis was instructed that to correct his behavior or face
further discipline, including termination. (R. at 009:Exhibit 9). Though some of Davis'
attendance violations may have been beyond his control, Davis cannot use this
justification because he could have kept in contact his supervisor before changing his
schedule.3 (R. at 050:30-34). Every element of the Department's own Rule on
attendance has been satisfied.
In Whipple v. Department of Workforce Serv., 2004 UT App 479, Whipple was
assigned a specific work schedule which she refused to keep. In affirming the denial
of benefits, this Court found that Whipple's conduct damaged the employer's interests
and was culpable. Whipple "had knowledge of what was expected of her under the
agreement, and she simply chose not to comply." Id. at *4. The same is true here.
Davis had a work schedule which he refused to keep. Davis admits receiving the
written warning that specifically reinforced his assigned schedule. Prosper had
legitimate business interests in having Davis abide by its attendance policy. Davis
3

In Trotta v. Department of Employment Sec,, 664 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1983), the
Supreme Court identified several factors in determining whether an employee's
absenteeism fell within the definition of misconduct. Such factors included: (1)
number of absences, (2) failure to give notice of absence, (3) breach of company rules,
(4) giving of a warning by the employer to improve attendance, and (5) absence
against orders or in the face of a warning. Id. 1199. In this case, Davis regularly
arrived late or left work early, Davis frequently did not give notice, (R. at 050:33-34),
Davis breached company rules by not adhering to his schedule, (R.044-45:40-44, 1),
and Davis received a warning to improve attendance which went unheeded. (R. at 00910:Exhibits 9-10). Based on the reasoning of Trotta, Prosper was justified for
terminated Davis for his attendance misconduct.
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knew what was expected of him and he simply chose not to comply. See also, Stegen
v. Department ofEmployment Sec, 751 P.2d 1160 (Utah App. 1988) (denying benefits
as the employee was repeatedly absent or tardy even though some absences were the
result of personal situations or poor planning). A finding that the element of
culpability was not satisfied is not supported by substantial record when viewed in the
light of the record as a whole. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g).
4.

Finally, the ALJ concluded that the element of culpability was not met

because "The team leader may have thought the stated schedule would lead to more
contacts with clients and more revenue, but the Employer did not show how it was
harmed by the Claimant's occasional adjustments to his work hours". (R. at
080)(emphasis added). The Board also found that "As a seasoned sales representative,
the Claimant was entitled to a little latitude in adjusting his schedule" and that Davis'
"actions were intended to benefit clients and maximize his personal income." (R. at
090). These conclusions ignore the record as well as Prosper's experience, expertise
and interests. Prosper testified that requires its employees adhere to a stated schedule
because it resulted in more contacts and more revenue. (R. at 048:10-11). There was
no testimony or other evidence to the contrary. The ALJ and Board state that Prosper
"may have thought" the schedule would lead to more contacts and more revenue, but
cite no testimony or evidence that the assigned schedule in fact did not lead to more
contacts and more revenue. The ALJ and Board also found that Davis engaged in
"occasional adjustments" and that as a "seasoned sales representative" Davis was
entitled to do so, (R. at 091), but such findings ignore the evidence that Davis didn't
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adhere to his schedule once during his last week of employment. Davis was absent,
late or left early May 7, May 10, May 11, May 12, May 13 and May 14. (008:Exhibit
8; 010:Exhibit 10; 043-044:23-44, 1-27). Davis was not a "seasoned sales
representative" nor did he only make "occasional adjustments" to his schedule.
Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202(l)(2010), on the standard for finding
culpability states:
(1) Culpability
The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If
the conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no
expectation it would be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be
shown. The claimant's prior work record is an important factor in determining
whether the conduct was an isolated incident or a good faith error in judgment.
An employer might not be able to demonstrate that a single violation, even
though harmful, would be repeated by a long-term employee with an
established pattern of complying with the employer's rules. In this instance,
depending on the seriousness of the conduct, it may not be necessary for the
employer to discharge the claimant to avoid future harm.
Applying the Department's own Rule to this case, Davis' conduct was culpable. Davis'
conduct was not an isolated incident and was likely to be repeated. Davis' prior work
record indicates that his failure to adhere to Prosper's attendance policy was not a good
faith error in judgment and Davis neither demonstrated a pattern of compliance nor
was he a long-term employee. Finally, Prosper had worked with Davis, trained him,
and warned him. Discharge was necessary to avoid future harm.
The culpability standard in unemployment cases doesn't require a finding of
actual harm but only potential harm. Fieeiki v. Department of Workforce Serv., 2005
UT App 398, *3, 122 P.3d 706, 707 ("The culpability standard, however, does not
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require actual harm to the employer, but only potential harm"). Prosper testified that
adhering to the specified schedule resulted in higher success rates and greater revenue.
(R. at 048:3-15). Prosper also testified that missing appointments reflected poorly on
Prosper and its partners. (R. at 047:38-42). There was no testimony or evidence to
establish that these business interests were not being impacted by Davis' actions.
Prosper properly established through uncontradicted testimony that it was harmed by
Davis' refusal to adhere to his assigned shift, and Fieeki only requires Prosper establish
potential harm. Id. A finding that culpability was not established is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in the light of the whole record, Utah Code Ann. §
63G-4-403(4)(g). Awarding benefits was therefore arbitrary and capricious. Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iv).

II. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
ELEMENT OF "KNOWLEDGE" WAS NOT ESTABLISHED.
In addition to proving the element of culpability, a just cause discharge also
requires proof of the element of "knowledge". The element of knowledge requires the
employer establish that the employee knew of the conduct expected, and that he or she
had the skill and ability to do the job. See Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202(2)(2010).
Davis had the skill to do his job. (R. at 055:3-5), and Davis wasn't terminated
because he couldn't do his job. Davis was terminated for failing to adhere to his shift
requirements. (R. at 043:14-27). Davis was instructed at the time of orientation of
Prosper's attendance policy. (R. at 044:40-42). Any question about whether Prosper's
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adequately explained its attendance policy during orientation was resolved when Davis
was issued a written warning on April 14, 2010, which instructing him to:
Work your scheduled shift of M 8AM-5PM, T-TH 12PM-8PM, F 8AM-4PM
and S 8:30 AM-1PM. Call me if you are going to be late or if something comes
up and you will not be able to make it to work or fulfill a scheduled
consultation. (R. at 009:Exhibit 9).
This warning has three critical elements. First, it informed Davis he was to work his
assigned shift. Second, it specifically outlined the days and times of Davis1 shift.
Third, the warning instructed Davis that if for any reason he needed to modify his
shift, to call his supervisor. The next section of the warning informed Davis "Failure
to correct the above actions immediately may result in future disciplinary action up to
and including termination. (R. at 009:Exhibit 9). Davis testified that he and his
supervisor "definitely" talked about his schedule (R. at 059:9-17).
R994-405-202(2) of the Department Rules outlines the standard that must be
met in order to establish the element of knowledge.
(2) Knowledge.
The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer
expected. There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm
the employer; however, it must be shown the claimant should have been able
to anticipate the negative effect of the conduct. Generally, knowledge may
not be established unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the
expected behavior or had a written policy, except in the case of a violation of
a universal standard of conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the
claimant had knowledge of the expected conduct. After a warning the
claimant should have been given an opportunity to correct the objectionable
conduct. If the employer had a progressive disciplinary procedure in place at
the time of the separation, it generally must have been followed for
knowledge to be established, except in the case of very severe infractions,
including criminal actions.
24

Comparing the Department's Rule against the facts of this case establishes that the
element of knowledge had been proven.
1.

The first sentence of R994-405-202(2) says "The claimant must have had

knowledge of the conduct the employer expected." Here Davis knew of the conduct
expected of him. Davis was issued a written warning that instructed him to: "Work
your scheduled shift of M 8AM-5PM, T-TH 12AM-8PM, F 8AM-4PM and S 8:30
AM-1PM". (R. at 009:Exhibit 9). This evidence is irrefutable. Davis signed the
written warning and also testified "Yeah. Yeah, we did-we talked about the schedule,
definitely. "(R. at 059:9-17). The written warning stated that the basis of the write-up
was "Shift Adherence/Job Abandonment". There is little evidence to support the
finding that Davis didn't have knowledge of the conduct expected of him.4
2. The second sentence of R994-405-202(2) says "There does not need to be
evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the employer; however, it must be shown the
claimant should have been able to anticipate the negative effect of the conduct." Davis
could reasonably anticipate the negative effects of his conduct. The written warning
stated that failure to improve his behavior could result in further disciplinary action
including termination. (R. at 009:Exhibit 9). The written warning was issued one

4

Assuming, arguendo, that Davis in fact thought his schedule was only a
suggestion, such a conclusion creates an inconsistency in the case. Davis was
terminated for failing to adhere to his schedule. The Board found Davis knew he
needed to get permission from his supervisor to deviate from his schedule. It is
inconsistent to find that Davis didn't know he was to adhere to a schedule yet find that
Davis knew he must communicate with his supervisor if he wanted to change his
schedule. There would be no need to obtain permission if Davis in fact did not have
an assigned schedule.
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month after being hired. (R. at Id.). Davis knew that failing to adhere to his schedule
resulted in missing an appointment. (R. at 009:Exhibit 9). Prosper testified that not
adhering to his schedule created distrust and reflected poorly on Prosper amd its
partners. (R. at 047:38-42; 048:19). As it is a violation of a universal standard to not
adhere to a company's attendance policy, R994-405-208(2)(a), the record establishes
that Davis knew or should have reasonable been able to anticipate the negative effects
of his conduct.
3.

The third sentence of R994-405-202(2) says "Generally, knowledge may

not be established unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected
behavior or had a written policy, except in the case of a violation of a universal
standard of conduct." Here Prosper had a written policy and issued a written warning
with a clear explanation of the expected behavior. Additionally, actual knowledge is
not required since it is a universal standard that an employee "be punctual and remain
at work within the reasonable requirements of the employer." See R994-405-208(2)(a).
4.

The fourth sentence of R994-405-202(2) says "A specific warning is one

way to show the claimant had knowledge of the expected conduct." Prosper provided
both verbal and written warnings. (R. at 009:Exhibit 9; 073:22-25). The April 14,
2010, written warning specifically outlined the expected behavior. (R. at 009:Exhibit
9). Davis signed the warning and testified that he review it with his supervisor. (R. at
059:9-17).
5.

The fifth sentence of R994-405-202(2) says "After a warning the

claimant should have been given an opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct."
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Davis was given from April 14, 2010, until May 14, 2010 to improve his behavior.
Davis's behavior did not improve. (R. at 049:6-8) Davis never demonstrated a
willingness to adhere to his assigned schedule, and during his last week of his
employment, Davis failed to adhere to his schedule even once. (R. at 010:Exhibit 10).
6.

The sixth and final sentence of R994-405-202(2) says "If the employer

had a progressive disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation, it
generally must have been followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case
of very severe infractions, including criminal actions." Prosper does not have a
progressive disciplinary policy. (R. at 048:21-23).
A review of the Department's Rule on the element of knowledge shows that
Prosper satisfied both the spirit of the Rule as well as each and every sentence of the
Rule. Davis provided no corroborating testimony or evidence to support his claims.
Davis also lacked credibility to testify about his separation at all. In applying for
unemployment benefits Davis untruthfully responded to a series of questions
answering "no" to whether he received any warnings, whether he violating any
company policies, whether he was terminated for attendance violations, or whether he
had been told to improve his performance. (R. at 012:Exhibit 12). In Ellsworth v.
Department of Workforce Serv., 2010 UT App 87, the claimant was found to have
committed fraud by making false statements in order to receive benefits. In this case,
Davis knew or should have known his answers were incorrect. It is contrary to the
record as a whole to find that Davis could "credibly" testify about his separation when
he provided so many false statements to the Department in applying for benefits.
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Prosper asserts that in light of the April 14, 2010 written warning there is
insufficient evidence to convince reasonable minds that Davis "simply did not
understand". The proper finding in light of the whole record is that Davis understood,
or should have understood, that he needed to work his assigned schedule, and he
simply chose not to. Whipple v. Department of Workforce Serv., 2004 UT App 479.

III. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
ELEMENT OF "CONTROL" WAS NOT ESTABLISHED.
In addition to proving the elements of culpability and knowledge, the element
of "control" must also be established in order to sustain a just cause discharge. Utah
Admin. Code R994-405-202(3)(2010) provides that the conduct causing discharge
must have been within Davis' control, and "Isolated instances of carelessness or good
faith errors in judgment are not sufficient to establish just cause for discharge." The
rule also provides that "continued inefficiency, repeated carelessness or evidence of a
lack of care expected of a reasonable person in a similar circumstance may satisfy the
element of control if the claimant had the ability to perform satisfactorily". Utah
Admin. Code R994-405-202(3)(2010).
In this case there is no evidence that the discharge was the result of an isolated
instance of carelessness or good faith error of judgment. The question therefore
becomes whether Davis demonstrated a lack of care, inefficiency or carelessness
regarding Prosper's attendance policy.
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The ALJ and Board didn't address the issue of control reasoning that because
Davis did not have the knowledge that he needed to adhere to a schedule, he couldn't
conform his behavior to in fact adhere to the schedule. (R. at 080; 091). As discussed
previously, Davis did know what was expected of him. Even if Davis did not want to
work his assigned schedule, Davis knew that he needed to keep in touch with his
supervisor when he altered his schedule. Davi? did not regularly keep in contact with
his supervisor as instructed. (R. at 050:18-34). This behavior evidences a lack of care,
inefficiency or carelessness on the part of Davis. Had Davis kept in contact with his
supervisor he may have been able to preserve his job. (R. at 049:20-23). Even if some
of Davis' comings and goings due to factors outside his control, it was within Davis'
control to pick up the phone or send a text message which he chose not to do. In
Stegen v. Department of Employment Sec., 75 lP.2d 1160 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) this
Court affirmed the denial of benefits on the grounds that "Although some of plaintiff s
absences were beyond his control, ... many of the other circumstances contributing to
plaintiffs absenteeism resulted from poor planning and from personal situations within
plaintiffs control". Id at 1163-64. After receiving a written warning with the
instruction to adhere to a schedule and communicate changes, a reasonable person
would have kept the schedule or at least consistently communicated changes to their
supervisor. Had the Board addressed the issue of control, it would have found that it
was within Davis' control to keep in contact with his supervisor. There is not
substantial evidence when viewed in the light of the whole record that Davis was
terminated for circumstances outside his control.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Workforce Appeals
Board's award of unemployment benefits to Davis on the grounds the decision is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in the light of the whole record, the
agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law, or the decision is otherwise
arbitrary or capricious. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-403(4)(d), -403(4)(g) &
403(4)(h)(iv)(West 2009).
Respectfully submitted this / 0 day of January, 2011.

Daniel J. Anderson
Counsel for Appellant/Petitioner
Prosper Team, Inc.
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ADDENDUM A

R994-405-202. Just Cause.
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements
must be satisfied:
(1) Culpability.
The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If the
conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no expectation it
would be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown. The claimant's
prior work record is an important factor in determining whether the conduct was an
isolated incident or a good faith error in judgment. An employer might not be able
to demonstrate that a single violation, even though harmful, would be repeated by a
long-term employee with an established pattern of complying with the employer's
rules. In this instance, depending on the seriousness of the conduct, it may not be
necessary for the employer to discharge the claimant to avoid future harm.
(2) Knowledge.
The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer expected.
There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the employer;
however, it must be shown the claimant should have been able to anticipate the
negative effect of the conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be established unless
the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or had a written
policy, except in the case of a violation of a universal standard of conduct. A
specific warning is one way to show the claimant had knowledge of the expected
conduct. After a warning the claimant should have been given an opportunity to
correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had a progressive disciplinary
procedure in place at the time of the separation, it generally must have been
followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very severe
infractions, including criminal actions.
(3) Control.
(a) The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's
control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment are not
sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued inefficiency,
repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of a reasonable person
in a similar circumstance may satisfy the element of control if the claimant had the
ability to perform satisfactorily.
(b) The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may be
necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. While
such a circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not mean benefits

ADDENDUM A
will be denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a discharge due
to unsatisfactory work performance, it must be shown the claimant had the ability
to perform the job duties in a satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made
a good faith effort to meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of
skill or ability and a discharge results, just cause is not established.

ADDENDUM A
R994-405-208. Examples of Reasons for Discharge.
In the following examples, the basic elements of just cause must be considered in
determining eligibility for benefits.

(1) Violation of Company Rules.
If a claimant violates a reasonable employment rule and just cause is established,
benefits will be denied.
(a) An employer has the prerogative to establish and enforce work rules that
further legitimate business interests. However, rules contrary to general public
policy or that infringe upon the recognized rights and privileges of individuals may
not be reasonable. If a claimant believes a rule is unreasonable, the claimant
generally has the responsibility to discuss these concerns with the employer before
engaging in conduct contrary to the rule, thereby giving the employer an
opportunity to address those concerns. When rules are changed, the employer must
provide appropriate notice and afford workers a reasonable opportunity to comply.
(b) If an employment relationship is governed by a formal employment contract
or collective bargaining agreement, just cause may only be established if the
discharge is consistent with the provisions of the contract.
(c) Habitual offenses may not constitute disqualifying conduct if the acts were
condoned by the employer or were so prevalent as to be customary. However, if a
claimant was given notice the conduct would no longer be tolerated, further
violations may result in a denial of benefits.
(d) Culpability may be established if the violation of the rule did not, in and of
itself, cause harm to the employer, but the lack of compliance diminished the
employer's ability to maintain necessary discipline.
(e) Serious violations of universal standards of conduct do not require prior
warning to support a disqualification.

(2) Attendance Violations.
(a) Attendance standards are usually necessary to maintain order, control, and
productivity. It is the responsibility of a claimant to be punctual and remain at work
within the reasonable requirements of the employer. A discharge for unjustified
absence or tardiness is disqualifying if the claimant knew enforced attendance rules
were being violated. A discharge for an attendance violation beyond the claimant's
control is generally not disqualifying unless the claimant could reasonably have
given notice or obtained permission consistent with the employer's rules, but failed
to do so.
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(b) In cases of discharge for violations of attendance standards, the claimant's
recent attendance history must be reviewed to determine if the violation is an
isolated incident, or if it demonstrates a pattern of unjustified absence within the
claimant's control. The flagrant misuse of attendance privileges may result in a
denial of benefits even if the last incident is beyond the claimant's control.

(3) Falsification of Work Record. (Omitted)

(4) Insubordination.
An employer generally has the right to expect lines of authority will be followed;
reasonable instructions, given in a civil manner, will be obeyed; supervisors will be
respected and their authority will not be undermined. In determining when
insubordination becomes disqualifying conduct, a disregard of the employer's
rightful and legitimate interests is of major importance. Protesting or expressing
general dissatisfaction without an overt act is not a disregard of the employer's
interests. However, provocative remarks to a superior or vulgar or profane language
in response to a civil request may constitute insubordination if it disrupts routine,
undermines authority or impairs efficiency. Mere incompatibility or emphatic
insistence or discussion by a claimant, acting in good faith, is not disqualifying
conduct.

(5) Loss of License. (Omitted).

(6) Incarceration. (Omitted).

(7) Abuse of Drugs and Alcohol. (Omitted).
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Petitioner Ronald D. Ellsworth
challenges the Workforce Appeals
Board's (the Board) finding that he
fraudulently obtained unemployment
benefits from the State of Utah while
concurrently obtaining unemployment
benefits from the State of California.
Because substantial evidence supports
the Board's findings, we will not set

Ellsworth,
whose
permanent
residence is in California, temporarily
relocated to Utah to complete a project
for a Utah-based company. When he
completed the job in April 2008,
Ellsworth returned to California. On
April 8, 2008, he filed a claim for
unemployment benefits in California
(the California claim) by answering
questions over the telephone. The
California claim had an effective date
of April 6, 2008, and he received a
California claimant guide a few days
later. When he filed the claim,
Ellsworth spoke with a California
unemployment insurance representative
who "told him he should file his claim
in Utah since that was where he had
worked for the previous year."
According to Ellsworth, he did not
expect to receive benefits from
California, so he filed an additional
claim for unemployment benefits in
Utah via telephone, using the
Department of Workforce Services' (the
Department)
Interactive
Voice
Response (IVR) system on April 9,
2008 (the first Utah claim). The first
Utah claim also had an effective date of
April 6, 2008.
In filing the first Utah claim,
Ellsworth was asked a series of
questions to determine his eligibility for
benefits. One question, which Ellsworth
answered in the negative, asked, "Have
you applied for benefits from railroad
or other state?" Ellsworth also failed to
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answer two related questions: "Have
you worked in two or more states?" and
"During the last 18 months has all
employment been in Utah?" After
completing the claims, Ellsworth
affirmatively "certified] that [he]
answered the IVR questions truthfully
and correctly."
A few weeks later, Ellsworth
began receiving unemployment benefit
payments from both Utah and
California. Despite filing weekly claims
in both states during this time period,
Ellsworth did not attempt to contact the
Department to correct his earlier
misstatement or inform them about his
receipt of California benefits. The
payments from both states continued
until September 2008, when Ellsworth
began working again. In January 2009,
Ellsworth's new job "was cancelled"
and he re-opened his claim for Utah
benefits (the second Utah claim).
Ellsworth "again answered 'no' when
asked if he had filed a claim in another
state." When an audit of Ellsworth's
claim showed that he had received
benefits in both Utah and California,
the Department terminated his benefits
and, after determining that Ellsworth's
actions were fraudulent, ordered him to
pay the Department a total of $8008:
repayment of the $4004 he received in
benefits and an additional civil penalty
of $4004, see Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4405(5)(a), (c) (Supp. 2009).[1] As a
result of the Department's finding of
fraud, Ellsworth was deemed ineligible
to receive future benefits for an
additional forty-nine weeks. See id. §
35A-4-405(5)(a). Ellsworth appealed to

the Board, which affirmed
the
Department's decision. On appeal,
Ellsworth challenges the finding of
fraud on the ground that his
misrepresentations were unintentional.
The Board's determination that
Ellsworth
fraudulently
obtained
benefits is a question of fact. See
generally Kearl v. Department of
Employment Sec, 676 P.2d 385, 386-87
(Utah 1983) (analyzing the finding of
fraud as a factual question). We will
reverse the Board's factual findings
"only if the findings are not supported
by substantial evidence." Drake v.
Industrial Comm% 939 P.2d 177, 181
(Utah 1997). "'Substantial evidence' is
that quantum and quality of relevant
evidence that is adequate to convince a
reasonable mind to
support a
conclusion." First Nat'l Bank of Boston
v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d
1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); accord
Viktron/Lika Utah v. Labor Comm'n,
2001 UT App 394, ^ 13, 38 P.3d 993.
Under the Employment Security
Act, a claimant for unemployment
benefits is ineligible to receive benefits
for each week with respect to which the
claimant "willfully made a false
statement
or
representation
or
knowingly failed to report a material
fact to obtain any benefit." Utah Code
Ann. § 35A-4-405(5)(a). A claimant
who does so will be deemed ineligible
to receive future benefits for "13 weeks
for the first week the [false] statement
or representation was made or fact
withheld and six weeks for each week
thereafter, " up to a total of forty-nine
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weeks. Id. Upon a finding of fraud, a
claimant who receives unemployment
benefits must repay any amounts
received and a civil penalty in an
amount equal to the oenefits received.
See id. § 35A-4-405(5)(a), (c). Once
fraud has been established, neither the
Board nor this court has discretion to
alter the statutory penalty. See id. §
35A-4-405(5); Diprizio v. Industrial
Comm% 572 P.2d 679, 680-81 (Utah
1977).
As
defined
in the
Utah
Administrative Code, fraud is "a willful
misrepresentation or concealment of
information for the purpose of
obtaining unemployment benefits."
Utah Admin. Code R994-406-401(2).
To establish a claimant's fraud, the
Department must show three elements:
materiality, willfulness, and knowledge.
See id R994-406-401(l).
With respect to the first element,
we conclude that substantial evidence
supports the Board's finding that the
Department established materiality.
"Materiality is established when a
claimant makes false statements or fails
to provide accurate information for the
purpose of obtaining . . . any benefit
payment to which the claimant is not
entitled . . . ." Id R994-406401(l)(a)(i). Here, the uncontroverted
evidence shows that Ellsworth "ma[de]
false statements or fail[ed] to provide
accurate information for the purpose of
obtaining . . . benefit payments]." See
id. Indeed, Ellsworth falsely stated[2] in
both the first and second Utah claims
that he had not applied for benefits in

another state. [3]
Ellsworth's
filing
claims
containing false
statements also
establishes the willfulness element.
"Willfulness is established when a
claimant files
claims or other
documents containing false statements,
responses, or deliberate omissions." Id.
R994-406-401(l)(c); see also Martinez
v. Industrial Comm'n, 576 P.2d 1295,
1296 (Utah 1978) ("The filing of the
claim evidences
a purpose or
willingness to present a false claim in
order to obtain unlawful benefits . . .
."). Here, the record plainly shows that
both claims contained false statements
and that Ellsworth actually filed the
claims.
Finally,
substantial
evidence
supports the Board's conclusion that the
Department established the knowledge
element. Knowledge is established
when "[a] claimant must have known or
should have known the information
submitted to the Department was
incorrect or that he or she failed to
provide [required] information." Utah
Admin. Code R994-406-401(l)(b). A
claimant has both "[t]he initial and
continuing burden" to provide the
Department with information regarding
the claimant's "eligibility to receive
benefits." Baker v. Department of
Employment Sec, 564 P.2d 1126, 1127
(Utah 1977). Even assuming that, as
Ellsworth argues, he either forgot about
the California claim or thought he did
not complete it, his error quickly
became apparent. [4] Within a few days
of filing the first Utah claim, Ellsworth
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received the California claimant guide
and began receiving unemployment
benefits from California a few weeks
later. After receiving the claimant guide
and benefits from California, Ellsworth
clearly knew or should have known that
his statements in the first Utah claim
were false and, under his "continuing
burden . . . to establish^ his] eligibility,
" id., he was required to alert
Department officials to the error but did
not do so. Moreover, after knowingly
receiving the California benefits for
several months, Ellsworth knew or
should have known that he had filed for
benefits from another state when he
sought to reopen his case by filing the
second Utah claim, yet he failed to
provide that information when asked.
Thus, there was substantial evidence to
support the Board's finding that the
Department
established
that
the
knowledge element was met.
Substantial evidence supports the
Board's conclusion that the Department
established each of the elements of
fraud. Therefore, we do not disturb the
Board's ruling that Ellsworth's actions
were fraudulent and that, as a result, he
is required to repay the improperly
received benefits and civil penalty. [5]
WE CONCUR: James Z. Davis,
Presiding Judge William A. Thorne Jr.,
Judge

Notes:
[l]As a convenience to the reader, we
cite to the current version of the Utah

Code because the relevant statutory
provisions currently in effect are
unchanged from those in effect when
Ellsworth filed his claim.
[2]Ellsworth also failed to provide
accurate information when he did not
answer the related questions of whether
he had worked in two or more states
and whether all recent employment had
been in Utah.
[3]We also reject Ellsworth's argument
that his fraud was due to his reliance on
the California unemployment insurance
representative who advised him to "file
his claim in Utah since that was where
he had worked for the previous year."
Even accepting that fact as true, the
representative did not advise Ellsworth
to give false information in filing his
claim or to accept benefits from both
states for the same period of
unemployment.
[4]Ellsworth also contends he had no
knowledge of the falsity of his "no"
answer to the question, '"Have you
applied for benefits from railroad or
other state?" because he either "pulled
[the phone] away from [his] ear to
punch the 'no' button" after he heard
"railroad" without waiting to hear the
rest of the question, or he answered
"no"
prematurely
due
to
his
uncontrollable "impulse to complete
other people's sentences." Although we
agree with Ellsworth that the question
could be phrased more clearly, that
does not excuse his failure to listen to
the question in its entirety before giving
his answer, which he certified was

truthful and correct.
[5]To the extent that Ellsworth raises
any other issues that are not specifically
addressed in this decision, we conclude
that the issues are inadequately briefed
and decline to address them. See
generally Utah R. App. P. 24 (detailing
briefing requirements); Daniels v.
Gamma W. Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009
UT 66, t 52, 221 P.3d 256 (declining to
address issues that were inadequately
briefed).
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OPINION:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Before Judges Billings, Bench, and
Greenwood.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner Maria Whipple seeks
judicial review of the decision

disqualifying
her from
receiving
unemployment compensation based
upon her discharge for just cause. The
case is before the court on a sua sponte
motion for nummary disposition.
An individual is ineligible for
unemployment benefits when he or she
is discharged for "just cause." Utah
Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(2)(a) (2001).
Factors to be considered in determining
whether just
cause
exists
are
culpability, knowledge, and control.
See Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202.
We uphold the agency's findings of fact
if they are supported by substantial
evidence when reviewed in light of the
whole record before the court. See
VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Comm !n, 901
P.2d 281 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
"An agency's [*2] application of law to
its findings of fact will not be disturbed
unless its determination exceeds the
bounds
of
reasonableness
and
rationality.'" Johnson v. Department of
Employment Sec, 782 P.2d 965, 968
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citations
omitted).
To successfully challenge the
Workforce Appeals Board's (Board)
findings of fact, Whipple must
demonstrate
that the
challenged
findings are not "supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record before the
court." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct App.
1989). She has not undertaken this
burden. Instead, she contends before
this court, as she did in the agency, that
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there is simply no evidence^ to support
the findings on insubordination. She
argues that she was successful in her
job, as measured by the increase in
Internet sales for the employer, that she
completed the required number of
hours, and that she was a valued
employee.
Whipple and the employer executed
an agreement based upon her proposal,
which
described
her
job
responsibilities, salary, and work hours.
The agreement stated that she would
work "on Mondays to Fridays from the
hours of 8: [*3] 30 am to 2:30 pm, a
period of 6 hours daily." It is significant
to note that Whipple agreed to specific
work hours that were relied upon by the
employer. Whipple admitted that the
employer discussed her tardiness and
related issues with her on at least three
occasions. Similarly, she admitted that
she told the employer that she should
not be held to the same requirements as
other employees. She also admitted that
she did not want to listen to the
employer's concerns about her job
performance on the day of her
termination because she did not want to
be "called on the carpet" and that she
expressed this to the employer.
Whipple fails to demonstrate that the
factual findings are not supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a
whole.
Both the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) and the Board focused on
insubordination, rather than tardiness
alone, as just cause for the termination.

The ALJ concluded that Whipple was
discharged "because she refused to
follow the employer's instructions and
refused to discuss any of the employer's
concerns with the employer." The
Board specifically noted that the
tardiness alone would not establish just
cause "since the employer repeatedly
condoned - [*4] albeit reluctantly —
the claimant's adamant refusal to abide
by its attendance policy." However,
disregard of the employer's instructions
created problems with other employees
and
undermined
the
employer's
authority. The Board concluded that
"the employer had a legitimate and
ongoing concern with the claimant's
flaunting of its attendance policy,
which caused disruption in the
workplace and created morale problems
with the claimant's coworkers."
"In
determining
when
insubordination becomes disqualifying
conduct, a disregard of the employer's
rightful and legitimate interests is of
major importance." Utah Admin. Code
R994-405-208. The employer had a
legitimate interest in having Whipple
abide by the attendance requirements in
the agreement, be present at daily
meetings, and be engaged in the
employer's business pursuits during
work hours, rather than her personal
pursuits. Her refusal to comply with the
employer's requirements caused morale
problems with other employees,
compounded by her dismissive attitude
about the problems. Whipple's conduct
damaged the employer and was
culpable. She had knowledge of what

was expected of her under the
agreement, she simply chose not to
comply. [*5] Finally, Whipple had
control over her own actions, including
the refusal to discuss the employer's
concerns. Under the circumstances, the
Board's determination that Whipple was
terminated for just cause is reasonable
and rational.
We affirm the Board's decision that
Whipple be disqualified from receiving
unemployment benefits.

Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge
Russell W. Bench, Associate Presiding
Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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APPEAL DECISION:

CASE NO:

10-A-10679-R

The request to reopen the hearing is granted.
The Department decision is reversed.
The Claimant is allowed unemployment benefits.
The Employer is charged.

CASE HISTORY:
Original Hearing Dates:
June 22 and July 7, 2010
Dates of Appeal Decisions:
June 21 and July 7, 2010
Requests for Reopening Dated: June 22 and July 13, 2010
Appearances:
Claimant and Employer
Issues to be Decided:
R994-508-117 andR994-508-118 - Failure to Appear
35A-4-405(2)(a)
- Discharge
35A-4-307 - Employer Charges
The original Department decision denied unemployment insurance benefits on the grounds the Claimant was
discharged for just cause. That decision also relieved the Employer's benefit ratio account for benefits paid
to the Claimant.
APPEAL RIGHTS: The following decision will become final unless, within 30 days from August 3,
2010, further written appeal is received by the Workforce Appeals Board (PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City,
UT 84145-0244; FAX 801-526-9244; or online at http://www.jobs.utah.gov/appeals) setting forth the
grounds upon which the appeal is made.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
Failure to Appear
The Claimant received the first Notice of Hearing the day before the hearing was to take place. He did not
understand that he needed to call in at least 24 hours prior to the hearing. On the day of the hearing the
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Claimant called the Appeals Unit and was told he could request reopening of the hearing. He filed his
request the same day. A new hearing was scheduled for July 7, 2010. The Claimant called prior to the
hearing and provided a telephone number. His phone did not ring on the day of the hearing, but the
Claimant noticed later that he had received a voice mail message from the Administrative Law Judge. He
called the Appeals Unit within ten minutes but he was too late to participate in the hearing. The Claimant
filed a second request to reopen the hearing within the time period allowed.
Separation from Employment
Prior to filing a claim for unemployment benefits effective May 9, 2010, the Claimant worked as a sales
representative for Prosper Team Inc. starting on March 1, 2010. The Claimant worked five or six days a
week and earned a straight commission. He was discharged on May 14, 2010, for attendance problems.
The Employer reviewed its attendance policy on the day of the Claimant's work orientation. The Claimant
did not recall specifics about the attendance policy, but he did understand that he was to call his supervisor
if he was going to be late or absent, and he understood he should work a minimum of 40 hours per week.
The Employer did not provide a copy of the attendance policy for the hearing.
The Claimant's team leader gave all the sales representatives on his team a work schedule that indicated
"higher contact hours" or the times that sales reps were most likely to reach potential customers. He said
that another team had tried it and found it to be helpful. The scheduled work times were: Monday 8 a.m.
to 5 p.m., Tuesday through Thursday 12 p.m. to 8 p.m., Friday 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., and Saturday 8:30 a.m. to
2 p.m. The Claimant believed the schedule was a suggested, or recommended, schedule. He did not always
adhere to the schedule because he made appointments at the convenience of his customers. The Claimant
came and went from the office as he saw fit. His work hours averaged 46.36 per week. The Claimant was
aware that other sales reps also came and went from the office at unscheduled times on a regular basis.
On April 12, 2010, the Claimant's car was being repaired. He had arranged to car pool with a coworker for
two weeks. On April 12, the coworker was late picking the Claimant up. The Claimant did not call his
supervisor to say he would be late. The Claimant missed an opportunity to speak with a potential customer
at 9 a.m. He called the customer later that day and scheduled an appointment. The Claimant's team leader
gave the Claimant a written warning for being late that day, not calling in, and missing a consultation. The
written warning included the sales reps' schedule and instructed the Claimant to work the schedule and let
his team lead know if he was going to be late or absent. After the Claimant received the warning he made
an effort to meet the Employer's expectations. He still did not understand that the stated schedule was
anything other than a recommendation.
The Employer's records indicate the Claimant did not work on Monday, May 10. The Claimant did not
remember whether he worked that day or not. He may have worked but failed to clock in and out, or the
time clock may have been out of order, which was not unusual. On May 11, the Claimant was scheduled
to work at 12 p.m. but did not arrive until 1:05 p.m. because his car would not start and he had to get it to
a friend for help. On May 12, 2010, the Claimant worked 9.35 hours. On May 13, the Claimant was
scheduled to work until 8 p.m. but he left at 5:11 p.m., after working 7.37 hours. The Claimant was
discharged on May 14, 2010, for not adhering to the schedule.
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REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Failure to Appear
The unemployment insurance rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-406(3) of the Utah Employment Secunty
Act provide, in pertinent part
R994-508-117.

Failure to Participate in the Hearing and Reopening the Heanng
After the Hearing Has Been Concluded.

(1) If a party fails to appear for or participate m the heanng, either personally or
through a representative, the ALJ may take evidence from participating parties and will issue
a decision based on the best available evidence
(2) Any party failing to participate, personally or through a representative, may
request that the heanng be reopened
(3) The request must be in writing, must set forth the reason for the request, and
must be mailed, faxed, or delivered to the Appeals Unit within ten days of the issuance of
the decision issued under Subsection (1)
R994-508-118.

What Constitutes Grounds to Reopen a Heanng.

(1) The request to reopen will be granted if the party was prevented from appeanng
at the hearing due to circumstances beyond the party's control
(2) The request may be granted upon such terms as are just for any of the following
reasons mistake, inadvertence, surpnse, excusable neglect, or any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the decision
(3) Requests to reopen are remedial m nature and thus must be liberally construed
m favor of providing parties with an opportunity to be heard and present their case Any
doubt must be resolved m favor of granting reopenmg
(4) Excusable neglect is not limited to cases where the failure to act was due to
circumstances beyond the party's control
(5) The ALJ has the discretion to schedule a hearing to determine if a party
requesting reopening satisfied the requirements of this rule or may, after giving the other
parties an opportunity to respond to the lequest, grant or deny the request on the basis of the
record in the case
In this case the Administrative Law Judge finds that the facts warrant a reopening of the heanng to allow
all parties the opportunity to be heard, and the failure to participate m the heanng falls withm the definition
of excusable neglect
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Separation from Employment
Unemployment insurance benefits must be denied if the employer had just cause for discharging the
employee In order to have just cause for discharge pursuant to Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah
Employment Security Act, there must be fault on the part of the employee involved The basic factors as
established by the rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-405(2)(a), which are essential for a determination of
ineligibility under the definition of just cause, are
(a)
Culpability The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious th at continuing
the employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interests
(b)
Knowledge The worker must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the
employer expected
(c)
control

Control The conduct causing the discharge must have been withm Ihe claimant's

The element of culpability is not established Although the Claimant did not consistently adhere to the
schedule supplied by his team leader, he nevertheless worked an average of 46 36 hours per week Further,
the Claimant worked on a straight commission basis The Claimant's failure to stick to the schedule set
forth by the Employer may have caused some concern for his team leader, but this situation was not so
serious that the Claimant needed to be discharged immediately The team leader may have thought the stated
schedule would lead to more contacts with clients and more revenue, but the Employer did not show how
it was harmed by the Claimant's occasional adjustment to his work hours
The element of knowledge is not established The Claimant followed the Employer's attendance policy as
he understood it He understood that he was to notify his team leader if he was going to be late or absent,
and he generally did Even after he received a written warning, the Claimant believed the stated schedule
was more of a recommendation He continued to see other sales reps, as well as his team lead, come and
go at unscheduled times He believed that by putting m more than 40 hours of work each week, he was
meeting the Employer's expectations He did not know his job was m jeopaidy and wab shocked at his
discharge
The element of control has not been established Because the Claimant did not understand that the schedule
was more than a recommendation or suggestion, he could not conform his behavior to avoid his discharge
Based on a preponderance of the evidence, the Employer has not established any of the three elements of
just cause and benefits are allowed
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DECISION AND ORDER:
Failure to Appear
The request for reopening of the hearing is allowed in accordance with provisions of Paragraphs R994-508117 and R994-508-118 of the unemployment insurance rules for Section 35A-4-406(3) of the Utah
Employment Security Act.
Separation
The original Department decision denying the payment of unemployment insurance benefits pursuant to
Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act is reversed. Benefits are allowed effective
May 9, 2010, and continuing, provided the Claimant is otherwise eligible.
The Employer is not relieved of liability for charges in connection with this claim, as provided by Section
35A-4-307 of the Utah Employment Security Act.

ktdwH

Rofcryn Spohgberg^
Administrative Law Judge
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES
Issued:
RS/tc

August 3, 2010
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DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed.
Benefits are allowed.
The Employer is not relieved of benefit charges.
HISTORY OF CASE:
In a decisiandaled August 3,2010, Case No. 1..0-A- 10679-R, the Administrative Law Judge reversed
"the.'Department decision and allowed unemployment insurance benefits-to the Claimant eileciive
May 9, 2010. The Employer, Prosper Team. Inc.. was ineligible for relief of benefit charges in
connection with this claim.
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
Flte Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision
pursuant to §35A—508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah
Administrative Code {1 ()97) pertaining thereto.
EMPLOYER APPEAL FILK1): September L 2010.
ISSLES BEFORE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
OF I T A H EMPLOYMENT SECURITY' ACI':
1.

Did the Employer have just cause for discharging the Claimant pursuant to the provisions of
535A-4-405«2)ui)?

2.

h the Employer eligible for relief of charges pursuant to the provisions of §35A~4~307{ I)?

FACTUAL FINDINGS:
The Workforce Appeals Board .adopts- in full the factual findings of the Administrative Law Judge.
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MAT: DAVIS
REASONING AND CONCLrSIONS OF LAW;
The Claimant worked for tSie Employer as a sales representative from March 1. 2010. until he was
discharged on Max 14. 2010 He earned a straight commission. 'Ihe Claimant received a woik
schedule from his team leader which was designed to take advantage of those times wnen sales
representatives were most likely to reach potential customers The Claimant hehe\ed the schedule
w as a recommended schedule and did not always follow the schedule I le made appointments at tne
coin cnienee of his customers He also went to work and left when he saw nt I he Claimant tell this
was appropriate as other sales representaines, including his team leader, often worked different
tchedules. Despite this, the Claimant averaged 4636 hours of work each week,
1

V Claimant received a written warning for being late on April 12.20! 0, 1 he Claimant was riding
to woiw with a coworkei and did not contact his supervisor when he was running late. The written
warning included an instruction to work the schedule given to him b\ his team leader The ('laiman;
made an effort to work that schedule but still considered it to be a recommended scnedule
It is noi clear whether the Claimant worked on Ma> 10. 2010 The Employer has no icccrd of the
Claimant working on tnat da) and the Claimant does not remember i! ne worked o: not I he
Claimant felt he max have neglected to clock in pnor to working that Ja> The Claimant was Luc
on May 11 and left earlv on Ma> 13 The Employer discharged the Claimant on Ma> 1- lor failing
to follow the assigned work schedule
1 he Administrate e Law Judge found that the Hrnployer failed to establish ntst cause for u- decision
to discharge the Claimant The Administrate e 1 aw Judge determined the Claimant tell the schedule
was a recommendation, worked on a commission-onh basis, and workec more than 40 1 oir each
w ee,\
On anneal to the Board the hrnployer argues it established just cause. The Kmpioyer argues the
Claimant knew* he was expected to work the assigned schedule and to call his supervisor if he wa>
liomu u« be late 1 he Fmplover also argues it was incorrect for the Claimant to assume hv could
cnme and go at will merely because his supervisor did. The hrnployer also argues the Claimant was
returned to work a specific schedule in order to have a higher success rate and the Rmpfover's
financial interest was jeopardized b\ the Claimant's refusal to work during the scheduled hours
Hnalh the hmplover argues the Claimant knew what was expected of him and had the joilm to
eonmh with those expectations
li;c i uemmo}mem Insuianee Rules pertaining to $35A-f-405{2)(a) o' the Clan LmpUnment
L v u V" wt vio\ idc. m pertinent part,
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R994-405-202. Just Cause.
To establish jusi cause for a discharge, each of the following tnree elements
must be satisfied:
(!)

Culpability.

The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious thai continuing the
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful i merest. Ifthe
conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no expectation it
would be continuec or repeated, potential harm ma\ not be shown The claimant's
prior work record is an important factor in determining whether the conduct was an
isolated incident or a good faith error in judgment. An employer might not be able
10 demonstrate that a single violation, even though harmful would be repeated by a
long-term employee with an established pattern of complying with the employers
ruies In this instance, depending on the seriousness of the conduct, it may not be
necessary for the employer to discharge the claimant to avoid future harm.
(2>

Knowledge.

The claimant must have had knowledge o( the conduct the employer
expected. There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the
employer; however, it must be shown the claimant should have been able to
anticipate the negative effect oi* the conduct, Generally, knowledge may not be
established uniess the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or
had a written policy, except in the case of a violation of a universal standard oi
conduct, A specific warning is one wa> to show the claimant had knowledge of the
expected conduct
After a warning the claimant should have been given an
opportumtv to correct the objectionable conduct, Ifthe employer had a progressive
disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation, it generally must have
been followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very severe
infractions, including criminal actions,
(3)

(ontrol

(a)
The conduct causing the disenarge must have oeen wuhm the
claimant's control, isolated instances of carelessness or good taith errors in judgment
are no! sufficient to establish jusl cause for discharge. However, continued
meflieienew tepeateJ carelessness or euaenec oi a lack of core expected of J
reasonable person in a similar circumstance may satisfx the element oi control ifthe
elaiman: had the ability to perform satisfactorily

ADDENDUM D

10-]J-0!r>4

-4-

XXX-XX-1361
MAT1 DAVIS

(b)
The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it ma*'
be necessary to discharge workers who do no: meet performance standards. WhiL*
such a circumstance ma> pro\ idc a basis for discharge, this does not mean benefits
will be denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases imoh ing a discharge due
to ur^atisiactory work performance, it must be shown the claimant had the ability tc
perform the job duties in a satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a
good faith effort to meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a Sack of ski!!
or ability and a discharge results, just cause is not established.
In order to establish just cause for a discharge, the iiraployer must satisfy all three elements of the
mst cause standard. 1 ierc\ the Hmployer failed to satisfy the necessary elements to show ras' cause
lo establish culpability, the Employer must show the Claimant's conduct was so serious that
continuing their relationship would jeopardize the Hmployer s rightful interests. The Claimant was
discharged for failing to work his assigned schedule. The Hmployer argues on appeal that it ^
necessary for employees to work a certain schedule to maximize revenue and to maintain consistency
and uniformity The bmployer also argues it is immaterial whether the Claimant worked more than
4H hours each week because he refused to work when the hmployer wanted him to work and ii was
detrimental to the Hmployer's interest for the Claimant no\ to work the assigned schedule The
Claimant. howe\er. provided credible testimony that he altered his schedule to better meet and serve
clients As a seasoned sales representative, the Claimant was entitled to a little latitude \n ..diluting
his schedule to meet with clients. The Claimant also worked more than 40 hours each week ami
w orked on a commission only basis. While the Hmployer has an interest in requiring its employees
k, work certain schedules, the Claimant's actions were intended to benefit clients and maximize his
persona! income. '1 he hmployer failed to show how the Claimant's actions actualh threatened the
Kmpknefs rightful interests The Hmployer also failed to show the Claimant's actions were so
egregious that they necessitated his immediate discharge 1 he hmployer failed to establish the
Cijmer/i of culpability
l o establish the element of knowledge, the Claimant must have an understanding of the conduct
expected hv the bmployer. The hmployer argues on appeal that the Claimant Knew/ he was expected
lo work a certain schedule The Claimant, however, provided credible testimony that he simply did
nut understand the assigned schedule was anything other than a recommendation. lie also provided
credible testimony he saw other employees and his team leader come and go at will and felt he was
entitled to do the same. The Claimant understood the Employers expectations to be that he work
more than 40 hours each week and maximize customer contacts. The Claimant fell he was meeting
me 1 nmioveA expectations and could not have anticipated the negaiwe consequences of not
adhering to what he believed to be a recommended sehedule 1 he Hmpkner sailed to estan.i^h the
element of knowledge
1 no element of knowledge must be established in order to establish the element oi control Absen;
a v icai understanding of the Hmployer* s expectations, the Claimant could not alter his actions to meet

ADDENDUM D

!0-iM)l 134

- 5~

XXX-\X~'36l
V1AT1 I)A\ IS

tiic hmployer's expectations and avoid being discharged. The Hmployer failed to establish the
element of control
The decision allowing benefits is affirmed. The Board adopts the Administrative Lavs Judge's
reasoning and conclusions ol km in full
DECISION:
'1 he decision of the Administrative Law Judge allowing unemployment insurance benefits to the
Claimant effective Ma> 9,2010. under the provisions of §35A-4-4()5t2)iah>fthe 1 Tail Hmployment
Secunh vet K affirmed
I ne Lmployer, Prosper 1 earn. Inc.. is ineligible for relief of benefit charge^ in connection with ihi>
claim, as pro\ ided b) 535 A-4-307( 1) ot the Act.
A I T HAL RIGHTS:
Pursuant to cJ63-46b-I3* I ><a> of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, you ma} request
reconsideration of this decision within 20 da\s from the date this decision is issued You; request
for reconsideration must be in writing and must state the specific grounds upon which relief is
requested The request must be Hied with the Workforce Appeals Board at 140 has: 30* South,
Salt Lake City, Utah, or ma> be mailed to the Workforce \ppeals Hoard at P.O. Box 45244.
Salt Lake Cm. 1 Itah H4145-0244. A copy of the request for reconsideration must also be mailec to
each, part) by the person making the request If the \\ orkforee Appeals Hoard does not issue an
ordeM v\ ithin 20 da\ s after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered
to oe denied pursuant to ^63-46b-13(3 Kb> of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. T he filing
of a recuest for reconsideration is not a prerequisite lor seeking judicial re\ie\s of this order 1( a
request for reconsideration, JS made, the Workforce Appeals Board will issue another decision 'J hi>
decision will set fortn the rights of further appeal to the Court of Appeals and time limitation for
such an appeal
You ma> appeal this decision to the I hah Court of Appeals Your appear must ne submitted in
wntmg within 30 dajs of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is locale*, on ihe
filth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse. 450 South State Street. P. O. Hox 14023(\
Salt Lake City. Utah 841144)230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board,
Department of Workforce Sen ices and am other party to the proceeding as Respondents. , e file
an apnea, with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition iur Writ
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oi Re\ icvv setting forth the reasons 101 appeal, pursuant to §35 A~4~508c8 j ofihe Utah Lniploymcni
Sccunt) Act, $(>3-46b-l 6 oi the I tah Administrative Procedures Act. and Rule 1 •+ of the i .ah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, followed bv a Docketing Statement and a I ,egal Brief as lequireu b\ Kule** V
and 2~L2"\ I tah Rule* ofAppcliate Procedure.
s ; ihomas Lewis
s/ William Shaw
DISSEN1:
respectful!) dissent from the majorats decision 'I he Lmployci ha> a legitimate interest in
K\itanng its empknees to work a specific schedule kmploxee.s are generalh not allow eo to de\ ule
from assigned schedules and come and go as the} see fit The hmployer prodded credible tesumom
mat the I iaimant s actions tincatened its economic interests and its ability to manage its empknees
! {eel the hmpkne* established the element of culpability
i ice! the Hmployei also established the element of knowledge While the Claimant ma> ha\e
initiall\ fnought the assigned schedule w as a recommendation, there should have been no doubt thai
it was a required schedule after receiving the written w anting on April ! 2,2010 I he warning make**
it clear the Claimant was expected to work an assigned schedule
Fnialh, 1 also lee: the Hmpkner established the element of eontro. I he Claimant si c ulu ha\e
understood the hmpkner expected him to work an assigned schedule and taken steps t ensure lie
worked when the Empkwer expected him to
's liffam Vincent

WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD
Dak Issued Septembei *>(), 2010
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MAILING CERTIFICA'I E
I hereb> certify that 1 caused a true and corrcci cop> of
the foregoing DECISION to be scned upon each of the following on
this 30', da> of September. 2010. h\ mailing the same, postage
prepaid. I'ruled States mail toPROSPER riiAVl INC
% HUMAN RESOURCES
5072 X 300 \\ SI'l 240
PROYOW1 84004-5652
MAPI DAVIS
211c>Kf\Ci SF
SALT LAKE CUT H 84lfK)-!301

